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1. Introduction  
Beginning in 2007, the world was shocked by a stock market crash that sent major 
indices (such as the S&P 500 and the MSCI Index) tumbling. The resulting effect was that 
investors’ portfolios shrank in value, and many asset management firms went into survival mode, 
while others went out of business. Apropos with the financial crisis, leading financial regulation 
experts and industry professionals alike blamed the failure on the policies related to self-
regulation (Credit Suisse, 2012: para. 1; CFA, 2013: 3). Former Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) Chairman, Christopher Cox, conceded that self-regulation of the 
investment banks contributed to the crisis (Labaton, 2008: para. 1-4). Some even go as far and 
argue that the “financial crisis resulted from the largely unregulated nature of global financial 
institutions” (Engobo et al. 2009: 230). While it is difficult to dispute these claims, some degree 
of introspection is needed to address these assertions of regulatory failure by SROs operating in 
the securities industry. Framed in relation to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 and the 
widespread concerns regarding the ineffectiveness of self-regulation in the securities industry, 
this study seeks to examine the enforcement practices of one such SRO: the Investment Dealers 
Association of Canada (IDA).1 The IDA was the national SRO that was responsible for policing 
investment dealers and their respective Member firms that traded on the debt and equity 
marketplaces in Canada. The IDA was responsible for setting its own education standards and 
regulatory requirements. Investment dealers and their respective entities were expected to 
comply with the IDA’s rules, or face sanctions ranging from fines to permanent bans from the 
Association for non-compliance.  
On the basis of an analysis of published data, this study will utilize the SRO’s misconduct 
funnel as it was developed by Brockman and McEwen (1990), and further refined by Brockman 
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(2004), to examine the enforcement of complaints by the IDA for six years (2002-2007) leading 
up to the GFC. Brockman and McEwen (1990) and Brockman (2004) modified the crime funnel 
that was initially developed in order to show how the number of cases involving street crimes 
shrank as they were processed from arrest to sentencing through the criminal justice system 
(CJS), and applied it to examine the disposition of complaints by The Law Society of British 
Columbia.  Brockman and McEwen’s model of case disposition by SROs is built on three 
fundamental concepts: “funnel in”, “funnel out” and “funnel away” (see Brockman and McEwen 
1990; Brockman, 2004). 
 
Figure 1: The SRO Misconduct Funnel 
As can be seen in Fig. 1, “funnel in” tests the claim made by SROs, “that they enforce 
standards which would not otherwise be enforced” by other government agencies (Brockman and 
McEwen, 1990: 3). At the center of this premise is the notion that SROs scrutinize a wider 
variety of behaviours and ensure a higher standard than government regulators (p. 3). “‘Funnel 
out’ looks at how offenders might escape disciplinary action once they enter the system, and the 
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potential leniency of penalties imposed on those who are formally sanctioned” (Brockman, 2004: 
73). The preoccupation of SROs to protect their own, “may function to keep their members from 
coming into contact with the CJS when criminal offences have been committed” (Brockman and 
McEwen, 1990: 4). This charge alleges that “SROs ‘funnel away’ individuals from the CJS who 
might otherwise come into contact with it” (p. 4). By applying the concept of the regulatory 
“funnel” to the context of professional self-regulation, this study will examine the enforcement 
practices of the IDA from 2002 to 2007. 
It seems rather obvious that SROs will track more complaints than coercive state led 
enforcement (see Brockman & McEwen, 1998; Brockman, 2004). The resultant effect is that 
SROs are more likely to “funnel in” more complaints than would have been handled by the CJS.  
The “funnel in” argument is simply not compelling enough to justify the call for industry self-
regulation (McCaffrey & Hart, 1998; Brockman, 2004).  Perhaps of more importance, is the 
"funnel out" and “funnel away” concepts, where cases were dealt with in a manner that resulted 
in a laxity of sanctions imposed and in  a lack of effective regulation (Canadian Foundation for 
Advancement of Investor Rights (FAIR Canada), 2011; Lokanan, 2014). Given this outcome, the 
objective of this paper is to examine the role of self-regulation in the Canadian securities 
industry and in doing so, address the following questions: To what extent were complaints 
‘funneled out’ of the IDA’s disciplinary system? Did the IDA ‘funneled away’ complaints with 
criminal elements from the CJS, which would have otherwise been dealt with as Criminal Code 
offences? 
In answering these questions, the study simultaneously makes two significant 
contributions to the literature on securities regulation.  First, the study examines the allegation 
that SROs’ inability to deal with the more serious securities fraud cases is symptomatic of a 
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much larger problem (Williams, 2012, 2013; Snider, 2009). It could very well be that the IDA 
and perhaps SROs that operate in the securities industry in general, are ineffective because they 
are not equipped and therefore unable to deal with the more serious cases, and thus, represents a 
much larger systemic industry problem. Therefore, a more meaningful contribution to the 
literature is to look at the findings within the larger context of securities regulation, to enable a 
firmer assessment of SROs’ enforcement performance. Second, over the last decade, SROs that 
operate in the securities industry have faced some significant challenges. Central among these 
challenges is the inherent conflicts- of- interests between SROs’ regulatory functions of their 
members and their market regulating duties (Dorn, 2011). The present study will take a closer 
look at this relationship  to show how one SRO – the IDA uses symbolic management to create a 
carefully crafted appearance of effective enforcement, despite empirical evidence showing its 
inability to effectively police the market in practice.   
Having briefly surveyed the contextual problems associated with SROs and securities 
regulation, the remainder of the paper proceeds according to the following format.  First, I 
provide a brief overview on SROs and the wider context of securities regulation in Canada. I 
then sketch the theoretical underpinnings and examine the arguments that have been used to 
justify the use of self-regulation and the criticisms leveled against its usage. This is followed by a 
brief description of the methodology employed to gather the data, and a discussion to address 
some of the limitations related to the data. I then examine the types of complaints received by the 
IDA and how these complaints were processed through the regulatory funnel from initial 
screening through to final disposition of the IDA’s disciplinary system. Finally, I discuss the 
findings within the wider context of securities regulation and highlight areas for future research. 
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2.  SROs and the Wider Context of Securities Regulation in Canada 
One hallmark of Canada’s securities regulatory landscape is the sheer number of different 
agencies with stakes in the regulatory game. The motley crew of agencies responsible for the 
governance of the securities markets, demands a brief review of their relationship. The agencies 
range from the SROs, to the provincial securities commissions, and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP), all of which have their own legislations and enforcement frameworks that 
govern securities regulation.  The commissions have their own Securities Acts; the SROs their 
Sanction Guidelines; and the RCMP the Canadian Criminal Code. The enforcement of these 
legislations is effected through administrative hearings, securities law quasi-criminal 
prosecutions, and criminal prosecution.  
The enforcement of the provincial securities legislations and SROs’ Guidelines are 
effected through administrative proceedings. The commissions can also effect quasi-criminal 
prosecutions under provincial securities laws in provincial courts.  Quasi-criminal offences are 
punitive proceedings and are brought under the provincial securities act or SROs’ Guidelines 
rather than the Canadian Criminal Code. Cases referred to the RCMP by the commissions and 
SROs or cases the RCMP initiated, are prosecuted under the Canadian Criminal Code.  
3.  Self-Regulatory Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Self-regulation: The Concept 
SROs come in many forms (Gunningham and Rees: 1997: 364). As such, there is no 
single overarching definition that guides their practices (Sinclair, 1997: 533-534). Rather, in 
order to appreciate the various dimensions of self-regulation, it is important to look at the context 
in which they operate. Depending on the context, a number of important definitions have been 
put forward. In its purest form, “self-regulation refers to situations in which firms, individuals, or 
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other parties are allowed to monitor and adjust their behaviour using certain standards and 
perhaps to set the standards themselves” (McCaffrey and Hart, 1998: 6). The implication of this 
definition is that industry self-regulation requires firms in the industry to decide to cooperate 
with each other (Gunningham and Rees: 1997: 365). These SROs are not “state-backed in the 
formal sense; the government neither legislates them into existence nor delegates powers to 
them” (Brockman and McEwen 1990: 2). Even though “the government might facilitate their 
formation through legislation governing associations and corporations, it is not usually involved 
in enforcing rules created by the SROs” (p.2). Examples of these are the early stock market 
exchanges, “where members participate in the group and adhere to written standards that govern 
the treatment of the group’s pooled resources” (p.9).  
A more attenuated definition notes that  “self-regulatory organization means [an entity] 
that is organized for the purpose of regulating the operations and the standards of practice and 
business conduct, in capital markets, of its members and their representatives with a view to 
promoting the protection of investors and the public interest” (Hockin Panel, 2009: 25).  Central 
to this definition is the notion that consumer protection is paramount to a self-regulatory 
framework (Gunningham and Rees: 1997: 365). Membership in these SROs confers status and 
gives the registered members a competitive advantage over non-members. Lack of membership 
however, “does not affect their ability to work in that market sector” (CFA, 2007:10). In Canada, 
provincial law gives a professional association for each accounting designations the power to 
govern the profession in that jurisdiction. An example of such an association is the Chartered 
Professional Accountants of British Columbia (CPABC). The CPABC has its own education 
requirements and standardized examinations that members are expected to complete in order to 
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be licensed as Charted Accountants (CA) in British Columbia. Once licensed, a CA has “Title 
Protection” and can expect to earn more than an accountant who is not licensed and accredited. 
Less synonymous with the other definitions presented so far, is one that highlights state 
intervention into the regulatory affairs of SROs (Black, 1996; Rees, 1998). Here, self-regulation 
is defined as “a system that encourages (‘regulates’) certain social behaviours by a collective (the 
‘Self’) in order to avoid direct state intervention (‘regulation’)” (CFA, 2007: 1). They are backed 
by the state, in that they are “created by legislation” and “delegated the power to make rules, 
investigate and adjudicate alleged breaches, and impose penalties on wayward members” 
(Brockman and McEwen 1990: 3). These SROs are usually established by professional groups, 
such as doctors and lawyers. An example of such an SRO is the Law Society of British 
Columbia. The Society has its own membership and licensing requirements for lawyers and 
articling students who wish to practice law in the province. Through the Legal Profession Act, 
there are provisions that govern the complaints and disciplinary processes of members accused 
of misconduct. The one distinguishing feature that sets these SROs apart from those that are 
classified as accredited associations with compulsory standards, is that individuals cannot offer 
specified services without being licensed by the regulatory body that oversees their profession. 
For others, self-regulation has evolved to refer to government or government agencies 
that oversee the regulatory activities of SROs. From this position, self-regulation is presented to 
mean  
 
the delegation of government regulatory functions to a quasi-public body that is officially 
expected to prevent or reduce both incompetence (lack of knowledge or ability) and 
misconduct (criminal, quasi-criminal, or unethical behaviour) by controlling the quality of 
service to the public, through regulating or governing a number of areas (Brockman, 1998: 
588).  
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Even though an SRO in this category has the power to regulate themselves, the “government 
retains ultimate oversight authority in which it can override the group’s regulatory proposals or 
impose rules and regulations as it deem[s] warranted” (CFA, 2007: 10-11; also see Brockman 
1998: 591).  The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in the U.S. falls into this 
category. The SEC oversees the regulatory activities of FINRA, but allows it to “generate rules 
and policies for broker-dealers and trading markets” (Pan, 2009: 17-18, 39). In Canada, the 
provincial securities commissions acted as the oversight committees for the SROs, which in turn 
oversaw the market regulation of exchanges, Member firms and investment and brokerage 
dealers. It is this form of self-regulation that is the principal focus of the present study.  
Based on the forgoing discussion, it is evident that there is no clear definition of what 
constitutes self-regulation. What is evident however is that “there is a continuum, with pure 
forms of self-regulation and government regulation at opposite ends” (Gunningham and Rees: 
1997: 366).  The underlying variable is the SRO’s relationship with the state, which starts from 
voluntary self-regulation and involves no formal supervision to the degree of government 
oversight exhibited over the SRO at the highly regulated end of the continuum. However, these 
pure forms of self-regulation rarely exist.  Instead, it may be more “helpful to think in terms of 
typologies of social control, ranging from detailed government command and control regulation 
to ‘pure' self-regulation, with different points on the continuum encapsulating various kinds of 
co-regulation” (p. 366).  
3.2. Self-regulation and The SRO’s Misconduct Funnel: Strengths and Weaknesses 
The SRO’s misconduct funnel incorporates both the benefits and criticisms of self-
regulation (Brockman, 2004: 55). Among the benefits of SROs, is that they claim to “‘funnel in’ 
more deviant behaviour than government regulators” would at a reduced cost. Central to this 
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claim is that SROs “enforce standards which would not otherwise be enforced” by other 
government agencies (Brockman and McEwen, 1990: 3). Standard setting and the detection of 
breaches of those standards should be the responsibility of those who are closest to the market 
(Gunningham and Rees, 1997: 366: Williams, 2012: 64). By virtue of their close proximity to the 
markets, the SROs are in a position where they are able to “scrutinize a wider variety of 
behaviours and thereby ensure a higher standard of conduct than if the public had to rely on 
government regulation” (Brockman and McEwen, 1990: 3). In many ways then, “funnel in” 
would subject more “deviant behaviour for observation, investigation and sanctions which would 
not otherwise be the subject of such careful review” under centralized government regulation (p. 
3).  
Certainly, self-regulation is not without its criticisms. Chief among these is that SROs are 
often seen as “being too lenient on their members and, rather than widening the net of social 
control as they claim, they are accused of “funneling out” so many complaints that they are 
ineffective in controlling wayward professionals” (Brockman, 2004: 55-56). Even though the 
standards are enforced, “enforcement is seen as ineffective and punishment as secret and mild” 
(Gunningham and Rees, 1997: 370). Self- regulation then  is nothing more than a governance 
mechanism that “attempt[s] to deceive the public into believing in the responsibility of an  
irresponsible industry” and “a strategy to give the government an excuse for not doing its job” 
(Braithwaite 1993: 91). The recognized by-product of this regulatory conservatism is that the 
“members of SROs, and not the public, are viewed as being the beneficiaries of self-regulation” 
(Brockman and McEwen, 1990: 4). 
Perhaps a more serious criticism of SROs is that their disciplinary system may keep their 
members from coming into contact with the CJS (Brockman, 2004: 57). This charge alleges that 
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“self-regulating professions take legitimate complaints of crime and have them ‘funneled away’ 
from the CJS” by dealing with them through their own disciplinary system (Brockman, 2004: 
57). In the world of market and finance, criminal enforcement of financial intermediaries and 
their employees   is seen as bad publicity and is not something that is encouraged by the SROs 
(Williams, 2012: 61).  
4.  Methodology  
4.1. Data source one 
Data from the IDA’s Annual Reports were used to examine the funnel metaphor from 
2002 to 2007. The data were used to examine how investigation and prosecution staff processed 
complaints from initial reporting to the Case Assessment Group, to final disposition. Data were 
collected on case assessments, investigation and prosecution outcomes of complaints.  Data 
comparing the penalties of cases that were sent to a formal disciplinary hearing for both Member 
firms and individual registrants were also gathered for further analysis.  
4.2. Data Source two 
 Data from the annual enforcement reports only allowed to examine the “funnel in” and 
“funnel out” aspects of the SRO’s misconduct funnel. The “funnel away” aspect of the 
misconduct funnel was examined through the IDA’s tribunal cases retrieved from Quicklaw. In 
total, 292 cases were retrieved and coded for quasi-criminal offences between 2002 and 2007. 
The quasi-criminal offences that were coded were fraud, forgery, false endorsement, 
misappropriation of funds, and securities act breach. These offences were classified as quasi-
criminal offences in the IDA’s Sanction Guidelines (see IDA, 2006: 2-3).  
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4.3. Limitations of the Study 
There are two limitations to the present study that need to be addressed. First, the analysis 
of this study is only informed with data gathered from the IDA’s enforcement annual reports and 
cases between 2002 and 2007. This is because the IDA’s enforcement annual reports are not 
available for the years preceding 2002. Furthermore, I am unable to extend the analysis to the 
five years of enforcement data now available for IIROC. While IIROC’s enforcement reports 
provide a high level overview of IIROC’s enforcement performance since its inception, it is not 
detailed enough to allow for rigorous quantitative comparison to be made with the IDA’s data.  
Second, a number of issues have been raised with respect to the accuracy of ComSet 
data.2 Of paramount importance is the tendency on the part of the firms to under-report problems 
or misdeeds that may have come to light (Williams, 2012: 117). Firms may disabuse clients of 
the validity of their complaints and encourage them either not to file a complaint or settle the 
matter in-house.  There may also be firms who are predisposed to game the system by 
distinguishing between service and non-service related complaints. Service related complaints 
are not reported. Since the IDA has never given a definition of what constitutes service related 
complaints, firms may deal with the complaints internally and chose not to report them to 
ComSet. (p. 117).  
In light of these limitations, some may be predisposed to argue that the aforementioned 
limitations may limit the credibility of the results. In this respect, it is important to pause and ask 
whether self-reporting by Dealer Members will uncover more systemic violations, and 
consequently make any significant impact on the results.  As you will soon see, no information 
power is lost, because the results from the data available provide sufficient information for a 
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representative analysis. It is therefore highly unlikely that there would have been any significant 
changes in the results with additional ComSet data.  
 4.4. The IDA Enforcement Process  
The IDA’s Disciplinary Sanction Guidelines list the offences for which the Association 
can discipline its registrants and Member firms (see IDA, 2006). The Enforcement Department 
of the IDA, “is responsible for investigating allegations of regulatory breaches by [the] IDA 
Member firms and their registered employees, and when appropriate, prosecuting registered 
employees and firms in an IDA administrative hearing” (IDA, 2008: 2). There are three types of 
IDA administrative hearings: Contested, Settlement, and Expedited.  The range of disciplinary 
sanctions is set out in sections 20.33 and 20.34 of the IDA’s By-Laws and may include one or 
any combination of the following: 
(i) a reprimand; 
(ii) a fine up to $1,000,000 for Approved Persons and $5,000,000 for Members 
per offence or an amount equal to three times the pecuniary benefit obtained as a 
result of any contravention, whichever is greater; 
(iii) suspension of a Member's rights and privileges or of an Approved 
Person’s approval to act as a partner, director, officer or employee of a Member, 
possibly on terms;  
(iv) termination of a Member's membership and the accompanying rights and 
privileges or revocation of an Approved Person’s approval;  
(v) expulsion of a Member from the Association or prohibition of an Approved 
Person’s approval for any period of time; and  
(vi) imposition of terms and conditions on a Member or conditions on a 
subsequent approval or continued approval of an Approved Person, as the Hearing 
Panel considers appropriate in the circumstances (IDA, 2006:4). 
The IDA’s enforcement process consists of three stages: case assessment (of complaints), 
investigations, and prosecution by enforcement counsel.  
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5. Findings 
5.1. The Funnel Process: Funnel in 
As mentioned earlier, SROs claim to “funnel in” more cases than the CJS would consider 
taking in (Brockman and McEwen, 1990: 13). In this section, I will look at the number of events 
reported to ComSet and complaints processed by the IDA’s Case Assessment Group. 
5.1.1. Events Reported to ComSet 
Table 1-1 Subject Nature of ComSet Events Reported 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Type of Events 
Reported 
C
ount 
Percent 
C
ount 
Percent 
C
ount 
Percent 
C
ount 
Percent 
C
ount 
Percent 
Unsuitable 
Investment 1249 46.8 776 40.9 732 39.8 779 40.3 734 39.3 
Unauthorized and 
Discretionary 
Trading 338 12.7 231 12.2 313 17 226 11.7 203 10.9 
Misrepresentation 120 4.5 79 4.2 92 5 94 4.9 0 
       
0 
Disputed fees, 
commissions, and 
charges                 130 7 
Transfer of 
Accounts 36 1.4 38 2 32 1.7 79 4.1 76 4.1 
Others 927 34.7 772 40.7 672 36.5 754 39 727 38.9 
Total 2670 100 1896 100 1841 100 1932 100 1870 100 
 
Table 1-1 indicates that Unsuitable Investments was the events most reported to ComSet. 
Regulators use suitability complaints to pursue what they consider to be more systematic 
misconduct. According to one IDA regulator,  
suitability is the number one complaint that comes from clients and we use those as 
pathfinders. Where we identify that a suitability case is in fact valid, we might look further 
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into the broker’s portfolios to see if this is just this particular client that got put into a 
particular type of equity, or is it more widespread across all of his clients (IDA #5, 9, as 
cited in Williams, 2012: 113).  
 
Suitability complaints are also used to assess more ostensibly and serious forms of misconduct 
by senior officers in the dealer firm. Consider what this IDA regulator had to say about one 
complaint.  
We had one example [where] the initial complaint was about suitability. We looked at the 
broker, and yes it was unsuitable. We looked across his portfolio and yes, he had all his 
clients in this particular equity. We looked more broadly. It was the branch manager that 
was actually getting a secret commission to park stock, and he was the one who was 
encouraging all of his brokers to put the stock in their clients’ portfolios. So we went from 
a suitability, to a secret commission, to basically a market manipulation offence (IDA #5, 
as cited in Williams, 2012:113).  
 
5.1.2.  Case Assessment 
The “Case Assessment Group is responsible for receiving cases from the public, ComSet 
and other regulators” (IDA, 2008: 9).  At the Case Assessment stage, the IDA’s staff will 
consider each matter to determine if there is sufficient evidence of a breach of the IDA’s rules 
that warrants further disciplinary action. Only cases with sufficient evidence and in the IDA’s 
jurisdiction will be sent to the Investigation team. With the remaining cases, the IDA may pursue 
a range of actions ranging from issuing a warning letter to the Member firm or individual 
registrant or refer the case to other regulatory agencies (including the securities commissions) 
and the police (see IDA, 2008: 9). 
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Table 1-2 Types and Percentage of Complaints (by Issue) Opened by the Case 
Assessment Group from January 01 – December 31 
Complaints 
of File Open 
by Issue 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Adequacy of 
books and 
records 16 1.5 9 0.6 6 0.5 4 0.3 5 0.4 6 0.5 
Capital 
deficiency 13 1.2 12 0.8 4 0.3 6 0.5 5 0.4 3 0.3 
Churning and 
excessive 
trading 7 0.7 16 1.0 14 1.1 8 0.6 3 0.2 10 0.8 
Client priority 
rule violation 3 0.3 1 0.1 3 0.2 1 0.1 2 0.2 7 0.6 
Conflict of 
interest 10 0.9 24 1.5 11 0.8 9 0.7 12 0.9 26 2.1 
Failure to 
comply with 
policy 8 0 0.0 5 0.3 4 0.3 9 0.7 9 0.7 5 0.4 
Falsification/fo
rgery of 
documentation 17 1.6 25 1.6 15 1.1 23 1.8 22 1.7 22 1.8 
Files with No 
Violation 
Assigned 1 0.1 0 0.0 2 0.2 4 0.3 2 0.2 4 0.3 
Inaccurate 
information on 
registrant 
application 6 0.6 3 0.2 4 0.3 2 0.2 2 0.2 2 0.2 
Inaccurate 
information on 
Termination 
Notice 2 0.2 2 0.1 0 0.0 2 0.2 2 0.2 1 0.1 
Inappropriate 
personal 
financial 
dealings 19 1.8 47 3.0 26 2.0 15 1.2 14 1.1 32 2.6 
Insider 
trading/self-
dealing 7 0.7 11 0.7 12 0.9 9 0.7 9 0.7 11 0.9 
Internal control 
violations 26 2.4 23 1.5 20 1.5 27 2.1 7 0.5 23 1.9 
Manipulation & 
wash trading 17 1.6 25 1.6 19 1.5 28 2.2 13 1.0 17 1.4 
Margin Issues 51 4.8 27 1.7 4 0.1 8 0.6 3 0.2 10 0.8 
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Complaints 
of File Open 
by Issue 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Misappropriati
on of funds or 
securities 3 0.3 10 0.6 4 0.1 2 0.2 7 0.5 10 0.8 
Misrepresenta
tion 30 2.8 145 9.2 114 8.7 99 7.8 117 8.9 129 
10.
6 
Money 
Laundering 1 0.1 2 0.1 2 0.2 2 0.2 3 0.2 0 0.0 
Other 0 0.0 208 13.2 260 19.8 188 14.8 272 20.7 139 11.4 
Poor 
performance 27 2.5 57 3.6 17 1.3 10 0.8 9 0.7 16 1.3 
Principal/agent 
issues 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Prospectus, 
exemptions and 
related matters 7 0.7 7 0.4 5 0.4 23 1.8 20 1.5 3 0.3 
Service issues 101 9.4 90 5.7 121 9.2 111 8.7 63 4.8 119 9.8 
Supervision 12 1.1 31 2.0 40 3.1 38 3.0 29 2.2 30 2.5 
Theft or 
fraudulent 
activities 31 2.9 29 1.8 18 1.4 23 1.8 32 2.4 80 6.6 
Trading outside 
jurisdiction 4 0.4 5 0.3 3 0.2 2 0.2 8 0.6 1 0.1 
Transfer of 
accounts 40 3.7 30 1.9 27 2.1 27 2.1 32 2.4 32 2.6 
Unauthorized 
or 
discretionary 
trading 119 11.1 420 26.7 311 23.7 322 25.3 325 24.7 301 24.7 
Undetermined 99 9.2 21 1.3 38 2.9 44 3.5 50 3.8 35 2.9 
Unsuitable 
investment 243 22.7 281 17.8 203 15.5 222 17.5 234 17.8 140 11.5 
Uniform 
Termination 
Notice 145 13.5 2 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Violation of 
Commissions' 
or other SROs' 
Orders 7 0.7 2 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 2 0.2 4 0.3 
Violation of 
IDA's orders 9 0.8 5 0.3 1 0.1 2 0.2 2 0.2 2 0.2 
Total 1073 100 1575 100 1311 100 1271 100 1315 100 1220 100 
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In total, there were 7,765 complaints “funneled in” by the Case Assessment Group 
between 2002 and 2007. That is an average of about 1, 294 complaints per year. The most 
common complaints opened by the Case Assessment Group over the six year period were 
complaints relating to improper sales practices, misrepresentation, and service related issues. As 
shown in Table 1-2, complaints related to unsuitable investments decreased by close to half from 
2002 when there were 243 (22.7%), to only 140  (11.5%) in 2007. Even though complaints 
decreased, unsuitable investments were still among the top two complaints opened by the Case 
Assessment Group throughout the five year period. On the other hand, complaints related to 
unauthorized and discretionary trading increased by more than half from 119 (11.1%) in 2002, to 
301 (24.7%) in 2007. Service related complaints such as the mishandling of cheques and other 
customer related issues, as well as complaints related to misrepresentation of facts to clients 
and/or Member firms, fluctuated throughout the six year period.  
Table 1-3 shows the number of files opened and closed by the Case Assessment Group 
from 2002 to 2007.  With the exception of 2007, the IDA was able to deal with and close more 
than 85% of the complaints opened by the Case Assessment Group during that period. By 
combining the number of complaints received from ComSet with those from the public and other 
regulatory agencies, the IDA is in a better position to “funnel in” and deal with more complaints. 
It is expected that the complaints with enough evidence for charges to be laid, will make their 
way down the disciplinary process and “[in] the long run…should actually increase consumer 
satisfaction and decrease the number of complaints” (see Brockman, 2004: 72).     
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Table 1-3 Total Files Opened and Closed by Case Assessment Group from 2002-2007 
As at 
Open at 
Jan 1 
Received 
During 
Period 
Total open 
files 
during 
period 
Closed 
During 
Period 
Open at 
End of 
Period 
Dec 31 
2002 134 1073 1207 1037 (85.9%) 170 (14.1%) 
Dec 31 
2003 170 1506 1676 1521 (90.8%) 155 (9.2%) 
Dec 31 
2004 155 1254 1409 1230 (87.3%) 179 (12.7%) 
Dec 31 
2005 199 1237 1436 1279 (89.1%) 157 (10.9%) 
Dec 31 
2006 183 1269 1452 1260 (86.8%) 192 (13.2%) 
Dec 31 
2007 196 1155 1351 1100 (81.4%) 251 (18.6%) 
 
5.2. The Funnel Process: Funnel Out 
Once the cases enter the system, there is the possibility that offenders may escape 
disciplinary actions by being “funneled out” and thus, “escap[ing] the net of social control” 
(Brockman, 2004: 73; Brockman & McEwen, 1990: 15). There is also the possibility that 
offenders may be given lenient penalties by the disciplinary committee (Brockman, 2004: 73).  
But before a complaint reaches the disciplinary committee, complaints must first go through two 
additional hurdles: investigation and prosecution stages (e.g., see Brockman, 2004: 73). At the 
investigation stage, the IDA’s investigative staff must establish that the case has sufficient 
evidence before it can be sent to Enforcement Counsel for prosecution (IIROC, 2008: 2). 
5.2.1. Investigation 
It can be argued that the “funneling out” of complaints started at the Case Assessment 
stage. As mentioned earlier, some complaints may not have been “within the jurisdiction of the 
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IDA,” or some may not have been “a regulatory issue [that] warrant[ed] further investigation” 
(IDA, 2008: 9). Complaints that fell into these categories were either closed or sent to the 
appropriate body (p.9). The cases that were determined to warrant further investigations by Case 
Assessment staff were then referred to the Investigation unit to begin a formal investigation. At 
the investigation stage, if the matters were outside the scope of the IDA, they were referred to the 
police, securities commission, or another regulatory agency (IDA, 2008: 12). Upon completion 
of the investigation, investigation staff would prepare a detailed investigation report with 
recommendations “that the matter be closed with no further action [being taken] due to lack of 
evidence; issue a cautionary letter; or refer the matter to Prosecution for possible formal 
disciplinary action” (p.12). 
5.2.2. Investigation Summary 
Table 1-4 Total Files Opened and Closed by Investigation Unit from 2002-20073 
As at 
Open at 
Beginning 
of Period ( 
Jan 1) 
Received 
During 
Period 
Total open 
files 
during 
period 
Closed During 
Period 
Open at End 
of Period 
Dec 31 2002 182 138 320 214 (66.9%) 106 (33.1%) 
Dec 31 2003 106 166 272 162 (59.6%) 110 (40.4%) 
Dec 31 2004 112 129 241 156 (64.7%) 85 (35.3%) 
Dec 31 2005 85 212 297 134 (45.1%) 163 (54.9%) 
Dec 31 2006 163 154 317 188 (59.3%) 129 (40.7%) 
Dec 31 2007 130 148 278 141 (50.7%) 137 (49.3%) 
 
As shown in Table 1-4, the number of files closed by the investigation unit was rather 
inconsistent throughout the five year period. Of particular importance is 2002, where the number 
of files closed was at its highest, reaching a peak of 214 (66.9%) and then decreasing 
substantially to 141(50.7%) by 2007. The inconsistency shown above should not detract from the 
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fact that the number of cases continued to shrink as they were processed through the IDA’s 
enforcement system. There are fundamental reasons for this shrinkage at the investigation stage. 
Chief among these is the “risk tariff” associated with successful prosecution and the attendant 
discretion and regulatory will to prosecute “high risk” cases.  
One of the benefits of framing enforcement in terms of the misconduct funnel is that it 
sheds light on the tendencies that constrained the IDA’s enforcement process. The first of these 
tendencies was the emergence of an enforcement culture that tended to be risk averse 
(Braithwaite, 2005, 2013). Perhaps motivated more by fear rather than commendation for 
pursuing cases where the rewards for successful prosecution were low and the punishment for 
failure were high (Gunningham, 1987: 89; Braithwaite, 2005: 173), exceedingly high standards 
were set for case viability, while carefully plotting their investigation according to the safest and 
more secure paths possible (Williams, 2012: 101).  This sort of conservatism was a reflection of 
the type of cases that were being closed because of a lack of evidence for successful prosecution. 
Litigation staff may have been cognizant of the high standards needed to secure a prosecution 
and may have chosen to close a case for the fear of going to court and losing. This type of 
‘regulatory inertia’ of afraid to lose mentality, suggests that the enforcement staff only pursued 
cases that they could win (p. 101). In deciding to prosecute ‘high risk’ cases, enforcement staff 
must toe the line carefully.  
The sense of caution that accompanied the avoider mentality was manifested in the 
discretion to prosecute 'high risk 'cases.  Even when a case was egregious enough to warrant a 
full investigation, regulators and law enforcement tended to be very cautious in their approach.  
A former member of the enforcement staff recounted the following message when dealing with 
litigation staff: 
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I remember one time where I wanted to bring an insider trading case and he came up and 
tried to convince me that I shouldn’t bring it because we could lose because of this and 
this. I basically said ‘bring the case we’re gonna win it. And the people pleaded guilty 
shortly after the charges were brought (Lawyer #22: 7, as cited in Williams, 2012: 101).  
The ‘tread carefully’ message was also driven home by a Crown Attorney with experience in 
prosecuting securities fraud cases: 
You tend to want to take a conservative approach to these things because the cost of 
getting it wrong is pretty high…your case could be thrown out unless you can find another 
way of proving it. You don’t want to embark upon a three, four, five year investigation 
based on information obtained from the securities commissions as your cornerstone. So 
you want to be conservative (Crown #2:, as cited in Williams, 2010: 102). 
Regulators’ aversion to risk consequently resulted in them taking on cases where they were 
certain of a win. More important however, was that the preoccupation with risk posed by the 
legal process could have produced perverse effect (Hawkins, 2002: 404). One such effect was 
the skewing to the distribution of cases towards straightforward matters at the expense of the 
more ‘high risk’ cases that may have been more difficult to litigate and prosecute (p. 404).  
When ‘high risk’ cases did come to the fore, the existing  turf war between the IDA, 
the provincial securities commissions, and the police made it difficult to secure successful 
prosecutions. Given that all these regulators had stakes in the regulatory game, it was 
inevitable that they would try to protect their turf and only handle cases that belonged to them. 
Consider the following excerpt from one of the IDA’s interviewees: 
The IDA does an investigation and you have a bunch of market participants that fall 
outside our jurisdiction and then at the end of the day we take disciplinary action against 
our broker, but the commission has no appetite to chase those guys. Then we go to our 
hearing, a natural question for one of the hearing panelists is ‘what’s happening over here?’ 
‘Nothing.’ ‘Oh nothing. Well if nothing is happening over here then why is this so 
serious?’ So you’re not getting the total picture. (IDA #2: 5-6: as cited in Williams, 2012: 
77).  
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The antecedent effect of this turf war was the balkanization of Canada’s financial market, which 
saw regulators releasing rules that were contradictory in nature, making it difficult for market 
participants to be compliant with them. Overlapping jurisdiction had given rise to a governance 
structure where multiple versions of rules were created on the same issue and released by both 
SROs and centralized regulators, each with regulatory stakes in the market. 
Together, these limiting effects were among the reasons why the nature of the complaints 
changed, as the cases moved from the Case Assessment Group to Investigations. As mentioned 
before, the top four complaints handled by the Case Assessment Group were unauthorized and 
discretionary trading, unsuitable investments, misrepresentation and service issues (see Table 1-
2).  As can be seen in Table 1-5 below, while unauthorized and discretionary trading and 
unsuitable investments remained in the top four, they were no longer the top two complaints 
dealt with by the Investigation staff throughout the six year period.  Rather, the top two 
complaints for each year were a mixed bag comprised of unauthorized and discretionary trading 
and unsuitable investments, as well as issues related to supervision, inappropriate personal 
financial dealings and theft and fraudulent activities. Other complaints that made up the top four 
that were sent to investigation were forgery, manipulation and wash trading, and conflict of 
interest. Noticeably missing from the top four complaints were misrepresentation and service 
related complaints. Since service related complaints are not seen as regulatory issues by the IDA, 
it is expected that they would not make it through to the Investigation unit. Misrepresentation of 
facts to clients, on the other hand, is seen as a regulatory issue and constitutes one of the 
regulatory offences under the IDA's Sanction Guidelines (see IDA, 2006: 46). One can only 
speculate that complaints regarding misrepresentation were disposed of at the case assessment 
stage, either because there was not enough evidence to build a case or the matters were classified 
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as technical breaches with no harm to investors and closed with a cautionary letter (see IDA, 
2008: 9).  
Table 1-5 Top Four Issues Referred to Investigation from 2003-2007 
Year 1 2 3 4 
2003 Unsuitable 
Investments 
Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
Supervision Falsification/ 
forgery 
2004 Supervision Inappropriate 
personal financial 
dealings 
Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
  
2005 Supervision Unsuitable 
investments 
Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
Manipulation and 
wash trading 
2006 Supervision Theft and 
fraudulent 
activities 
Unsuitable 
investments 
Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
2007 Supervision Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
Conflict of 
Interest 
Unsuitable 
investments 
5.2.3. IDA Internal Prosecution  
Files referred from Investigations were then reviewed by the IDA’s Enforcement 
Counsel. Once Enforcement staff determined that there had been a breach in the IDA’s rules that 
warranted a disciplinary action, they then prepared the matter for a formal hearing. Cases with 
insufficient evidence to meet the legal test to prove a case may have been closed with a warning 
letter; closed with no further action or referred back to investigation for further inquiries (IDA, 
2008: 35-36). 
23 
 
5.2.4. Prosecution Summary 
Table 1-6 Results of Cases that were Referred to Enforcement Counsel for Prosecution from 
2002-2007 
        Closed During the Period     
As at Open at 
beginning 
of period 
(Jan. 1)  
Receive
d 
during 
period 
Total 
files 
open 
With 
No 
Action 
With 
Action 
& 
Warnin
g 
Letters 
Stayed Dis
miss
al 
Total 
closed 
during 
period 
Open 
at End 
of 
Period 
Dec 31 
2002 
209 86 295 41 
13.9% 
147 
49.8% 
    188 
63.7% 
107 
36.3% 
Dec 31 
2003 
107 137 244 31 
12.7% 
90  
36.9% 
    121 
49.6% 
123 
50.4% 
Dec 31 
2004 
121 88 209 17 
 8.1% 
101 
48.3% 
2  
1% 
1  
.5% 
121 
57.9% 
88  
42.1% 
Dec 31 
2005 
87 71 158 14 
 8.9% 
63  
39.9% 
5  
3.2% 
2 
1.3% 
84 
53.2% 
74  
46.8% 
Dec 31 
2006 
73 118 191 10  
5.2% 
69  
36.1% 
2 
1% 
1  
.5% 
82 
42.9% 
109 
57.1% 
Dec 31 
20074 
106 70 176 12 
6.8% 
59  
33.5% 
    71 
40.3% 
97  
55.1% 
 
Once a complaint reaches Prosecution, it faces further hurdles (see Brockman, 2004: 73). 
At the Prosecution stage, the IDA Enforcement Counsel will consider the recommendations 
made by the Investigation unit and decide how to proceed with them. As shown in Table 1-6, 
Enforcement Counsel continued to “funnel out” investors’ complaints by closing a significant 
number of complaints at the Prosecution stage without further action.  Enforcement Counsel was 
at its busiest in 2002, when they closed 188 (63.7%) of the cases. However, the number of 
complaints closed decreased significantly to 71 (40.3 %) in 2007. As was seen in the Case 
Assessment and Investigation stages, Enforcement Counsel continued with the trend to dispose 
of complaints informally.  
Table 1-7 shows the types of complaints that were referred to Prosecution. While 
unsuitable investments were one of the top four complaints dealt with at both the Case 
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Assessment and Investigation stages, it was noticeably missing as one of the top four complaints 
that made their way to Prosecution.  A few reasons have been put forth for this outcome. It is 
noted that unsuitable investments can be measured in shades of grey. In other words, there may 
not have been the necessary clear and cogent evidence that would have resulted in a hearing that 
was likely to be successful. The results were that the matters may have been resolved through 
informal resolution or closed with no action (Condon and Puri: 2006: 33). In other 
circumstances, the complaints can cover a wide range of related issues and may not have been 
related to suitability issues at all. These issues range from “poor advice, a poor or unsuitable 
product, or just a ‘complaint of convenience’ as the complainant did not know how else to 
describe the complaint” (Black, 2006: 43). In other scenarios, “enforcement counsel may review 
a number of allegations that have been investigated and use discretion as to which complaints to 
proceed with and which files to close” (Condon and Puri: 2006: 33).  There were also instances 
where the 
decisions about prosecuting are effectively made for the regulator. This occurs when 
clients withdraw their complaints or refuse to attend as witnesses.  Case law suggests that 
in the absence of a client witness it is very difficult to prove a case of suitability. Where 
witnesses are compensated, the monetary incentive for them to provide assistance in a 
regulatory hearing disappears, and in many of those circumstances the regulator is unable 
to proceed with the prosecution (p. 33).  
 
All of the above are possible explanations as to why complaints related to unsuitable investments 
are disposed of before they reach the Prosecution stage of the IDA's enforcement process.  
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Table 1-7 Top Four Issues Referred to Prosecution from 2003-2007 by Hearing Panels 
Year 1 2 3 4 
2003 Unauthorized 
and 
discretionary 
trading 
Supervision Falsification/forgery Capital 
deficiencies 
2004 Unauthorized 
and 
discretionary 
trading 
Supervision Falsification/forgery   
2005 Supervision Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
Capital deficiency Inappropriate 
personal financial 
dealings 
2006 Supervision Capital 
deficiencies 
Falsification/forgery Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
2007 Theft and 
fraudulent 
activities 
Supervision Capital deficiency 
and Manipulation 
and wash trading 
Unauthorized and 
discretionary 
trading 
.  
On the other hand, the most common types of disciplinary actions relate to brokers who 
conduct discretionary and/or unauthorized trades. Canadian securities law specifically prohibits 
investment brokers from exercising discretion in their clients’ account. A broker must have 
specific orders from his or her client to buy a specific security at a specific point in time (Baines, 
2012: para. 26). Brokers break this rule simply as a matter of convenience:  
The broker has approval in principle from the client and, on that basis, he makes the trade. 
While that is still a breach, it is not as serious as unauthorized trading, where the broker 
doesn’t have any agreement with the client at all (para. 27).  
Warren Funt, IIROC’s vice-president of Western Canada, identified some of the reasons why 
this might be the case: 
The first is monetary: the broker simply wants the commissions. The second is ‘just plain 
laziness.’ The broker can’t be bothered getting trained and registered as a portfolio 
manager, which would allow him to make trading decisions on behalf of his clients. The 
third reason is that some brokers really believe they are acting in the best interests of their 
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clients. Funt says that, even if their intent is good, they are taking a huge risk, because if 
something goes wrong, the client can come back at them (Baines, 2012: para. 29-32). 
 
Irrespective of the broker’s good intention, sales or purchases of securities without the client’s 
prior knowledge, goes against the just and equitable principle of trade.  
Managing the outcomes of these actions by the myriad of actors and agents involved in 
stock transactions is not always in black and white. Statutory regulations “have offered important 
supports for those individuals who seek to invest their money in the market” (Reichman, 1991: 
284). As noted above, these cases can be hard to police because it is not always clear whether 
“someone is a victim of a fraud or a reckless investor” (Gray & McFarland, 2013: para. 6).  In 
many ways then, market regulation can provide the context where at least theoretically, all 
investors can calculate the odds of investing in the market; but, as is evident from the discussion 
so far, regulation is not always compatible with investors’ actions (Reichman, 1991: 284; 
Braithwaite, 2013: 2). With this in mind, I now proceed to examine the “funnel away” aspect of 
the SRO’s misconduct funnel. 
5.3. The Funnel Process: Funnel Away 
Continuing on with the funnel metaphor, the “funnel away” aspect of the regulatory 
funnel is concerned with whether SROs deflect cases away from the CJS in order to protect its 
members (Brockman & McEwen, 1990: 27). Under this assertion, it is expected that the IDA 
may not refer cases involving fraud, misappropriation of funds, and forgery to the CJS for 
investigation. Given that some of the cases with evidence of criminality may be difficult to prove 
in the CJS, the IDA might be justified in dealing with them internally. That said, the purpose of 
the “funnel away” aspect of the IDA’s enforcement process is to identify the types of cases with 
“evidence of criminal activity” that could have justifiably been referred to the CJS (see IIROC, 
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2008: 1). This is not to say that these individuals would have been necessarily convicted of a 
criminal offence if charged, but it may have helped to identify some of the types of misconduct 
that have “element[s] of criminal” activities attached to them (IDA, 2006: 12).   
Table 1-8 Quasi-Criminal Cases Funneled Away by the IDA 
     
Cases Funneled Away from 
2002-2007 
    Type of Hearing 
Total     Settlement Contested 
Quasi- Criminal 
Offences 
Fraud 3 12 15 
Forgery 15 22 37 
False Endorsement 3 0 3 
Misappropriation of 
Funds 
8 18 26 
Securities Act 
Breach 
13 8 21 
Total number of cases 28 29 57 
Total percent of cases 49% 51% 100% 
 
Table 1-8 shows the cases that were "funneled away" from the CJS by the IDA. From 
2002-2007, there were 57 individual offender’s cases that dealt with quasi-criminal offences. Of 
these, 28 (49%) were disposed of via settlement agreements and 29 (51%) through contested 
hearings. The fact that close to half of the quasi-criminal cases was disposed of via settlement 
agreements is in itself an issue of concern. One would have thought that these cases would have 
been referred to the CJS or alternatively, because of the alleged seriousness of the offences, they 
would have at least been sent to a contested hearing to be heard by an IDA’s hearing panel. On 
the surface, it may seem as if the IDA does not have an adequate basis to decide how to deal with 
quasi-criminal cases. However, there may be other compelling reasons why the IDA might 
facilitate settlement agreements with respondents. As one IDA regulator pointed out, the 
evidentiary requirements might be difficult to establish in a hearing:  
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We may agree that the investor’s been harmed. We may agree that something was wrong. 
But can we prove it? If we can’t prove it, then we can’t go to a hearing. Or, if we do go to a 
hearing and the panel is not convinced, then that’s as far as we can go (IDA interviewee # 
5, as cited in Williams, 2012: 133).  
 
There are also other instances where high powered attorneys seek to obtain an advantage for 
their clients on procedural rather than substantive grounds. According to one senior regulator,  
[a] big challenge for all of us has been the criminalization of securities law. In the old days 
when there were administrative proceedings you didn’t get people hiring [high profile 
lawyers] to represent them. You do today because there’s a lot at stake. And that tends to 
bring in a complexity in the process because they of course want to introduce procedural 
practice that exist in the criminal courts but aren’t really supposed to apply in an 
administrative context (IDA interviewee # 6, as cited in Williams, 2012: 150).  
 
Together, these processes have come to represent a significant drag on the disciplinary process 
and combined to explain the significant proportion of settlement agreements entered into with 
the respondents. That said, it is possible that some of these cases were dealt with as quasi-
criminal offences by the provincial courts, but there was no indication in the cases examined that 
quasi-criminal prosecution was pursued by Crown counsel.   
5.4. Imposition of Penalties 
Table 1-9 Penalties Assessed on Individual Offenders by Hearing Panels   
Individuals   
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Fines $2,292,000 $2,401,250 $4,147,000 $2,142,500 $3,092,500 $1,817,712 $15,892,962 
Costs $323,400  $531,035  $773,015  $392,797  $490,744  $478,718  $2,989,709  
Disgorgement $34,740  $312,996  $573,881  $653,862  $507,055  $133,669  $2,216,203 
Total 
Decisions 
46 41 64 42 32 42 267 
Warning 
Letters 
76 27 19 8 22 8 160 
Suspensions 10 2 7 11 14 15 59 
Conditions 25 19 37 30 28 26 165 
Permanent 
Bars 
6 9 17 14 9 9 64 
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Table 1-9 shows the total decisions completed by the IDA’s disciplinary committee for 
the period from 2002 to 2007. Judging from the number of cases completed, the IDA continued 
to informally process complaints before they reached a hearing panel.  On average, only about 45 
cases per year made their way to a disciplinary hearing between 2002 and 2007. This is a striking 
contrast to the number of complaints that were initially processed by the Case Assessment Group 
in Table 1-3 above. 
Table 1-9 also shows the penalties imposed by the IDA’s hearing panels from 2002-2007. 
With the exception of 2004 and 2006, when the total fines imposed were $4,147,000 and 
$3,092,500 respectively, the total fines imposed for the other years never exceeded $2.5 million.  
In addition to fines, warning letters and terms and conditions were the most frequent penalties 
imposed, followed by permanent bans from the Association and a period of suspension from 
working in the industry. Of these, a permanent ban is considered to be the most severe (see IDA, 
2006: 12). A permanent bar is usually reserved for cases where  
the public itself has been abused; where it is clear that a respondent’s conduct is indicative 
of a resistance to governance; the misconduct has an element of criminal or quasi-criminal 
activity; or there is reason to believe that the respondent could not be trusted to act in an 
honest and fair manner in all their dealings with the public, their clients, and the securities 
industry as a whole (IDA, 2006: 12). 
 While a permanent ban can be seen as a deterrent, and that the IDA succeeded in getting rid of 
the individual from the industry, only 64 (or roughly 6 permanent bans per year) were imposed 
over the six year period. 
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Table 1-10 Penalties Assessed on Member Firms 
 
Table 1-10 shows the penalties imposed on Member firms.  On average, there were 
roughly nine Member firms disciplined per year. The total fines levied on Member firms were at 
its highest in 2004, amounting to $20,583,577. With the exception of 2002, the total fines 
imposed on Member firms did not exceed $2 million dollars for any other year. Even though the 
number of Member firm cases heard in 2004 was one more than the average, the disparity in 
fines over the six year period is partly due to the number of firms that were fined for market-
timing offences in that year, for which harsher fines were imposed. One possible reason for the 
linear relationship between total fines and disgorgement imposed for 2004 is that Member firms 
had to disgorge the commissions earned from the market-timing offences.  
Of the non-monetary penalties, warning letters were the most frequent sanctions imposed. 
From 2002 to 2007, the IDA’s hearing panels handed out 57 warning letters. On the other hand, 
only 5 firms received permanent suspensions and 6 were terminated.  A termination or a 
permanent ban on a Member firm is a serious penalty and is usually reserved for the more 
serious transgressions. How can these findings be interpreted? Are we supposed to believe that 
only 6 firms were involved in cases that deserved termination notices? Given that a considerable 
number of the complaints opened by the Case Assessment Group had criminal or quasi-criminal 
Firms   
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Fines $4,110,000 $191,654 $20,583,577 $1,046,596 $1,930,651 $1,045,000 $28,907,478 
Costs $337,675 $73,535 $280,069 $227,000 $98,241 $85,000 $1,101,520 
Disgorgement 0 0 $20,978,577 $506,596 0 0 $  21,485,173 
Total 
Decisions 6 6 10 13 11 6 52 
Permanent 
Suspensions5 2 0 0 2 0 1 5 
Terminations 2 1 0 0 3 0 6 
Warning 
Letters 16 13 5 8 11 4 57 
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element to them, it is difficult to comprehend why only 6 firms were terminated.  Or is it that the 
IDA will only go after its Members who violate rules that warrants insignificant penalties such as 
warning letters? Whatever the reason, there was a litany of scandals involving brokerage firms in 
Canada within the last 10 years, and the fact that only 6 of them were terminated between 2002 
and 2007 indicates that the IDA is reluctant to get tough with Member firms.    
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1. The Funnel Metaphor Revisited 
This study looked at the enforcement of complaints by the IDA and utilized data from the 
IDA’s Enforcement Annual Reports and tribunal cases. The data allowed me to employ the 
regulatory funnel to examine the processing of complaints from initial screening to final 
dispositions in the IDA’s disciplinary system.   The argument that SROs “funnel in” more 
complaints than the state could deal with cannot be ascertained because there is no basis upon 
which to compare this assertion.  What is known, however, is that with the addition of ComSet, 
the IDA was able to better position itself to scrutinize a wider variety of complaints, than it 
would have done otherwise. In reviewing these complaints, the IDA achieved greater inspectorial 
depth because the Case Assessment Group was able to look at more infractions with the 
existence of ComSet. The fact that the IDA looked at complaints that the state would not be 
interested in, is likely proof that the IDA does “funnel in” more complaints. ComSet also 
allowed the IDA to streamline the reporting process and made it easier for Members to report 
complaints.  The existence of another avenue for investors to report their complaints is therefore 
significant.  
The “funneling out” of complaints at the Investigation and Prosecution stages implies that 
the IDA is ineffective in controlling wayward registrants. The criticism that SROs are too lenient 
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on their members and that they “funnel out” complaints from the system, was evident in the 
Investigation and Prosecution stages in the IDA’s enforcement process. The number of 
complaints opened shrank significantly as they made their way from Case Assessment through to 
Investigation and Prosecution. The disposition of cases at the Investigation and Prosecution 
stages only allows for written reprimands - a penalty that is nothing more than a regulatory wrist 
slap.  As such, the claim made by SROs that they set and impose higher standards than state 
regulators, is not substantiated in the IDA’s case. The appearance of lenient enforcement sends 
the wrong message to investors and investment professionals, and implies that the Association 
does not take these matters seriously.  
There is also support for the claim that SROs’ function to deflect complaints with 
criminal elements away from the CJS. As shown in this study, the findings from the cases that 
made their way to an IDA hearing illustrated that the IDA was likely deflecting complaints with 
criminal elements away from the CJS. Perhaps this is because the IDA was more interested in 
protecting its members, rather than fulfilling its legislative mandate to serve the public interest. 
This inherent conflict -of- interest raises questions on the effectiveness of SROs to be a part of 
the investors’ safety net in the securities industry (Dorn, 2011). Some scholars even expressed 
concerns over whether SROs are working for the benefit of their members or serving the public 
interest as they so often claim to be (Brockman, 2004; Condon, 2008). An SRO that is supposed 
to be in charge of safeguarding the investing public, but at the same time, deflects investors’ 
complaints away from the CJS, is tantamount to putting a fox to guard a henhouse.  
 
 
33 
 
6.2. Broader Contribution to the Existing Research Literature 
In the beginning, I mentioned that the present study makes two significant contributions 
to the research literature on securities regulation. First, SROs’ inability to deal with the more 
serious securities fraud cases is symptomatic of a larger industry wide problem – that is, they are 
not equipped and therefore unable to tackle these cases. Before excoriating the IDA for this 
handicap, it is important to pause and consider the fundamental reasons for this systematic 
failure. With respect to the question of referrals to the police, it is entirely possible that the IDA 
did refer these cases to the police (or referred very similar cases in the past) but was rebuffed. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the police in general and the Integrated Market 
Enforcement Team (IMET) in particular, are not at all interested in taking on smaller cases from 
the SROs and securities commissions (Snider, 2009; Williams, 2012) – exactly the kinds of cases 
that are ending up at the bottom of the IDA’s misconduct funnel. As one securities fraud lawyer 
noted,  
“one of the most common complaints directed by regulators towards IMET is their 
unwillingness to take on smaller files with clear criminal overtones: ‘IMET don’t touch 
anything unless it involves multi-millions of dollars whereas the small frauds, they don’t 
have time for’” (Lawyer #6: 7, as cited in Williams, 2012: 72).  
 
With case flow depending on the strategic interest of IMET, the IDA may have very well come 
to the conclusion that the complaints, while containing criminal elements, were not egregious 
enough to justify sending them to IMET.   
IMET’s failure to look at cases with criminal overtones could be because of their lack of 
expertise to investigate and prosecute securities offences in general. In the blunt assessment of a 
senior securities lawyer:  
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Unless things have improved remarkably, and it sounds like they’ve gotten worse, in my 
day the RCMP couldn’t do anything. They were police officers who had no sophisticated 
understanding of financial markets. I don’t want the securities commission to investigate 
murder. I don’t want the RCMP at the same time to investigate insider trading. Most of the 
RCMP that were involved had a long history as police officers with very limited 
knowledge of the market. They were often given six week courses or six month courses in 
accounting and law and expect them to become experts. It’s a joke (Lawyer #22: 4: as cited 
in Williams, 2012: 90). 
  
Meanwhile, IMET’s officers struggle to find non-structural explanations for their failures: 
 
‘The mandate [was] set extremely high…’ ‘It is now interpreted as [meaning that] every 
file has to affect the economy. This is a very high bar’ … ‘We’re being held to account 
because timelines were announced.’…’We need to deliver fast on a few big cases’ …‘I 
think there should be … a National Securities Act – that would make [stock market fraud] 
a federal statute. This would give the RCMP a mandate to enforce’ (Interviewees responses 
to Snider, 2009: 190-191). 
 
 
IMET's lax enforcement of Criminal Code violations means that the burden to investigate and 
prosecute these complaints falls on the securities regulators.  
The implication so far in the analysis is that, were the IDA to refer more cases to IMET 
to investigate and prosecute, and assuming that IMET takes on these cases,  it would lead to the 
IDA being a more effective regulator. However, this overlooks the specific nature and 
characteristics of these cases and their significance from a larger regulatory perspective. 
Specifically, it should not be surprising that the offenses that end up at the bottom of the 
misconduct funnel involve fraud, forgery, and misappropriation of funds, as these are the most 
egregious forms of misconduct and they have a negative impact not only on the client, but also 
and more importantly, on their employer and the markets (Barnes, 2011: 187-188). In addition, it 
is likely that most of these cases involve advisors at the margins of the industry who have 
received warnings in the past but continued to engage in misconduct. And yet, the fact that these 
are the most egregious cases does not mean that they are the most significant from a regulatory 
perspective (see Barnes, 2011: 181-185). Indeed, it is likely that the harm to investors associated 
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with these forms of fairly conventional criminal activities are dwarfed by the much larger 
problem of unsuitable investment advice as well as unauthorized and discretionary trading 
articulated earlier. These cases often involve legal ambiguities and grey areas that make them 
less suitable to formal disciplinary action. Following from this, the more accurate and 
meaningful conclusion would thus be that the IDA is ineffective because it is unable to handle 
these more serious and systemic industry problems, and not necessarily its failure to pass overtly 
criminal cases over to the police. 
The second signification contribution to the literature has to do with the overarching 
point of tension between the SROs’ mandate to protect its members, while at the same time 
bolster investors’ confidence and market integrity through active enforcement. The need to strike 
the right balance between safe and competitively regulated markets and efficiency in financial 
transactions has long been recognized as a core feature of financial market regulation (see 
Reichman, 1991). But as the following reveals, it is a double-edged sword: 
You have this very difficult balance between doing an active regulatory job, which means 
ferreting out the proverbial bad guy and making sure the public is protected from him, and 
at the same time not creating what may be construed as an unnecessary chill in the 
marketplace or in some way discouraging the investment of capital in [the] markets. So 
that’s one of the conundrums that the [SROs] face and it’s a difficult one. And that’s why 
you’ll see in some regimes there’s no enforcement at all… (Former OSC #2: 4, as cited in 
Williams, 2012: 48). 
 
 
To manage the appearance of active enforcement, many SROs have turned to symbolic 
management. Symbolic management was advanced by Manning (1997) in his work on police 
agencies and the response to their mandates. According to Manning, police forces present a well-
crafted image of effective enforcement largely for the media and public consumption, 
notwithstanding their inability to enforce the law in practice (pp. 19-22). To make a statement of 
active enforcement, the police will go after a small time con-artist, with an active media audience 
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present to convey a powerful message of enforcement activity. This is all done despite the fact 
that the con-artist is usually a small player in the larger criminal network and will do very little to 
deter other criminals from circumventing the laws. The result is detachment between the 
symbolic face of the police and effective policing.  
 The notion of symbolic management is relevant to SROs’ policing of the market, as they 
go about managing their enforcement mandate. In particular, symbolic management highlights 
the concerns of managing the public face of the agency, a phenomenon that is not far off from 
the minds of the SROs’ enforcement staff (see Williams, 2012: 49). Evidence of symbolic 
management was captured in the IDA’s statistics going back to the year 2000.  There were 
approximately 57 disciplinary proceedings from the year 2000 to June of 2008, involving IDA’s 
registered Member firms. Of these 5 (or about 9%) applied to the top five banks.  How can one 
comprehend these numbers when about 90% to 95% of the financial transactions in Canada flow 
through the top five banks, while at the same time about 91% of the IDA’s disciplinary actions 
did not involve these banks? Does this mean that the IDA was captured by the five banks (who 
were its sponsors), or that the banks were more honest than the small brokerage firms that 
formed the majority of the disciplinary proceedings?  If the disciplinary actions were in the 90% 
range for banks, it would have indicated a direct correlation. On the contrary, what the numbers 
seemed to indicate was that the IDA rarely went after the big fish (i.e., top banks), and did go 
after the small brokerage firms to make a statement of active enforcement. Alternatively, it could 
very well be that the IDA was unable to discipline its top Dealer members because of inherent 
conflict-of-interest issues.  
The IDA has responded to the impetus to manage its appearance of effective enforcement 
and ward off government intervention in a variety of ways. The obvious one is of course to build 
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a strong relationship with the media. A case in point is the interview conducted by Vancouver 
Sun’s columnist, David Baines with Funt in which notable successes were highlighted and new 
initiatives were discussed (see Baines, 2012). Perhaps more important are the commissioned and 
annual reports, which cast the SROs’ enforcement activities in a favourable light and tout them 
as strong enforcer of market malfeasance. Senior management personnel then used these reports 
in major conferences to outline the threats currently facing the markets and the steps they have 
taken to counter those threats (Williams, 2012: 50; Jenah, 2013: 13). These speeches intended to 
cast the organization in a favourable light, masked the institutional problems faced by SROs to 
protect the integrity of the market and simultaneously regulate in the public interest.  
6.3. Self-Regulation and Global Financial Regulation 
The findings presented in this paper have implications for self-regulation in global 
finance. If one is to measure the effectiveness of self-regulation in Canadian finance by using the 
proportion of fines and non-monetary sanctions imposed on market participants as a yardstick of 
effective regulation, then it is evident that self-regulation is not working. The securities markets 
are changing rapidly and the increasing complexity of financial products and practices are having 
an effect on the SROs’ ability to regulate in the public interest (CFA, 2013: 3). Part of this 
changing infrastructure relates to the advancement of technology, which has caused the securities 
markets to become more electronic (CFA, 2007: 3). The access to high-speed internet has 
transformed the availability of and nature of financial products sold in the markets. This coupled 
with the low-cost global transfer of complex financial instruments, has brought about changes 
that are straining the capacity of SROs to regulate these products in sophisticated and well-
integrated securities markets  (Williams, 2012, 2013).  
One of the financial instruments that caused strain on self-regulation to regulate 
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effectively is asset-backed commercial papers (ABCPs). Indeed, Canada’s ABCPs’ crisis in the 
period leading up to the global financial meltdown, mirrored the practices in the U.S. sub-prime 
mortgage fiasco, the events surrounding the credit risks associated with Northern Rock in the 
U.K., and the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland – also in the UK. Regulators – both SROs 
and of the state -- wiped their hands of these issues, until it was too late. In Canada, the ABCPs 
were packaged as securities and sold off to investors by investment firms. In the U.S., the sale of 
sub-prime derivatives was blamed on a mixture of self-regulation and the dispersion of market 
regulation across various financial intermediaries. In the U.K., the high risk lending and the 
balkanization of the European market resulted in a sovereign debt crisis that sent shock waves in 
the Eurozone.  All national oversight authorities, by allowing the sale of sub-prime assets 
globally, were clearly shirking. They all relied on self-regulation where the governance 
mechanisms were still reflective of older market structures, and have yet to build and staff their 
operations with the expertise needed to monitor complex financial instruments (CFA, 2007, 
2013; Semmler  & Young, 2010;  Williams, 2013).  
Canada’s financial sector has long been subjected to a fragmented regime, in part due to 
the fractured relationship between the provincial securities regulators, the SROs, and the police 
(Bhattacharya, 2006). In countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., market participants’ report to a 
central body as in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). In Canada however, financial firms such as brokerage houses, as well as dealer 
members who trade in the exempt markets and their employees, must report to the SROs and the 
provincial securities commissions, both of whom have overlapping jurisdictions over these 
market players (Williams, 2012). This overlap decreases the efficiency of Canadian regulators to 
police market participants, and opens the door for regulatory arbitrage. The lack of transparency 
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as to who bears the ultimate responsibility of regulatory oversight over market players is also 
experienced in the far East. Hong Kong for example, has a three tier system of financial market 
regulation where various regulatory bodies are responsible for translating policies into 
regulation, supervision of financial services business, and supervising the activities of their 
members. The development of these ad hoc regulatory agencies led commentators to 
characterize Hong Kong’s financial system as “fragmented” (Pan, 2009: 48).  Hong Kong’s 
“confusing matrix of sectoral laws and agencies with many gaps and inconsistencies” was seen 
as not being readily suited to deal with the GFC (Arner, Hsu, & Da Roza, 2010: 45).  Fractured 
and fragmented, these mazes of regulatory miasmas allow regulators to short change the public 
and conceal criminal code violations when they occurred. The fragmentation of financial 
regulation is a major stumbling block for investors’ protection, and the U.K. and the U.S. (with 
their centralized model), should all be aware of this having been home to some of the major 
financial scandals in the recent past.  
6.4. What’s Next?  
The results from this study should prompt researchers and regulators with greater access 
to resources and information to conduct further cross-disciplinary research on securities 
regulation. Cases such as “Enron, WorldCom and Vivendi Universal do not appear in neatly 
labeled packages—addressed to ‘sociology’, ‘finance’, or ‘economics’. Rather, they are 
phenomenological misfits, requiring a radical conceptual reconfiguration in order to be 
adequately appropriated” (Tinker and Carter, 2003: 577). Future research on market regulation 
and their intermediaries should take stock of this complexity and encourage further dialogue 
between white-collar criminology, sociology, finance and accounting – disciplines that are 
critical to an integrated analysis of market governance.  Such a study must be cognizant of the 
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tensions that arise from pursuing cross-disciplinary research and mine the possibilities that a 
significant body of knowledge may arise and reveal new insights to market regulation. As a 
starting point, researchers can join hands and engage in a cross-disciplinary study that will 
examine whether IIROC with its increased enforcement budget and new image, is holding 
market participants accountable to law and ethical standards. It may be that the personnel who 
were part of the IDA are still heavily involved with IIROC’s operations.  Does this new body 
with its independence and higher enforcement budgets make investors safer in Canada? 
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1 In 2008, the IDA (the SRO responsible for regulating investment and brokerage firms in 
Canada) and Market Regulation Services Inc. (“RS”- the SRO responsible for regulating the 
marketplace), merged to create the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada 
(IIROC). 
2 The IDA’s Complaints and Settlement Reporting System (ComSet) is a database maintained by 
IIROC that requires Member firms to report investors’ complaints and disciplinary actions taken 
against registrants.   
3 In interpreting these findings, it is important to point out that some of the files that were closed 
in a particular year were in fact open in the previous year.  
4 The number of cases stayed and/or dismissed for 2007 was not recorded in the IDA’s 2007 
annual report. One can only assume that for various reasons, the IDA chooses not to record these 
because the number of cases left open at the end of 2007 should have been calculated as follows: 
(176-71 = 105 instead of 97).  
5 A permanent suspension will end up in a termination or a winding up of the firm. Firms that 
wind up are voluntarily released from the membership - expulsions are non-voluntary. 
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